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Abstract
Objectives This study is the first rigorous evaluation of the impact of Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) on improving
access to outpatient and inpatient care, utilising longitudinal data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey.
Methods Two treatment groups were identified: a contributory group (N = 982), who paid the premium voluntarily, and a
subsidised group (N = 2503), paid by government. Each group was compared with the uninsured group (N = 8576).
Propensity score matching combined with difference-in-difference approaches was used to estimate the causal effect of the
JKN programme.
Results The results found that JKN increased the probability of inpatient admission for the contributory and subsidised
groups by 8.2% (95% CI 5.9–10.5%) and 1.8% (95% CI 0.7–2.82%), respectively. The contributory group had an increase
in probability of an outpatient visit of 7.9% (95% CI 4.3–11.4%).
Conclusions The JKN programme has increased the utilisation of outpatient and inpatient care in the contributory group.
Those with subsidised insurance have an increase in access to inpatient facilities only, and this is of a smaller magnitude.
Hence, while JKN has improved average utilisation, inequity in access to both outpatient and inpatient care may remain.
Keywords Health insurance  Developing countries  Utilisation  Policy evaluation
Introduction
Universal health coverage (UHC) is a key health policy
concern in most low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs) (Lagomarsino et al. 2012; World Health Organi-
zation 2014; Maeda et al. 2014). The inclusion of UHC in
the health section of the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) has created renewed momen-
tum for national health insurance schemes (United Nations
2018). Therefore, it is important for countries introducing
or expanding health insurance to learn from experience of
other countries, and this study contributes to this important
evidence base.
By mid-2018, nearly 186 million individuals in
Indonesia (76% of the total population) were covered by
Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN), one of the largest
single payer social health insurance programmes in the
world (Pinto et al. 2016; BPJS Kesehatan 2017). Consid-
ering the low coverage of private health insurance (1.5%),
it is estimated that 22.5% of Indonesian population is still
uninsured (Mahendradhata et al. 2017). Introduced in
January 2014, the JKN programme unified several previ-
ously fragmented public health insurance, including Askes
(which covered public formal sector employees), Jam-
sostek (private formal sector employees), and Jamkesmas
(the poorest population). In general, there are two big
groups of JKN enrollees: (1) the subsidised group or
Penerima Bantuan Iuran (PBI)/Contribution Assistance
Recipients including the poor population and disabled
individuals, and (2) the contributory group consisting of
Peserta Pekerja Penerima Upah (PPU)/salaried employees
(government and private), Peserta Pekerja Bukan Pener-
ima Upah (PBPU)/non-salaried workers, and Peserta
Bukan Pekerja/non-workers. While the salaried employees
are required to contribute a certain percentage of their
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salaries, the other two groups are required to contribute by
paying a fixed amount of premium based on their chosen
inpatient ward class (Kesehatan 2017). The difference in
inpatient ward classes mostly determines the amount of
non-medical facilities, but all patients should receive a
similar quality of medical services regardless of the class.
A descriptive analysis from the Indonesian socioeco-
nomic survey (i.e. SUSENAS) showed an increasing trend
of utilisation for both outpatient and inpatient care amongst
the JKN enrollees compared to the uninsured in 2016.
However, this finding is likely to be sensitive to insurance
selection bias as the survey is not randomised, and there is
no control for previous insurance status prior to the intro-
duction of JKN in 2014 (Statistics Indonesia 2018). Pre-
vious studies have evaluated earlier forms of health
insurance using different datasets and approaches, with
mixed findings. Johar evaluated the health cards pro-
gramme introduced in 2000 and found that it did not
increase outpatient utilisation due to the inelastic demand
amongst the recipients (Johar 2009). Hidayat and Pokhrel
analysed the impact of Askes and Jamsostek and found a
positive outpatient utilisation effect especially on private
facilities (Hidayat and Pokhrel 2010). Sparrow et al.
evaluated the health insurance programme for poor people
(Askeskin) and found positive utilisation effects on out-
patient care (Sparrow et al. 2013). Lastly, Vidyattama et al.
evaluated Askeskin using different datasets and found a
positive effect on the probability of utilising outpatient care
(Vidyattama et al. 2014).
Recent longitudinal data from the Indonesia Family Life
Survey (IFLS) in 2014 provide an opportunity to conduct
the impact evaluation of the JKN programme. In this study,
we examine whether the implementation of Indonesia’s
JKN programme improved access to health care, measured
in terms of utilisation, for its enrollees. Subgroup analysis
explores differences in impact between socio-economic
groups, urban/rural areas, and the availability of healthcare
facilities. Importantly, we also distinguish two types of
JKN enrollees, subsidised and contributory group, as we
believe both groups have different characteristics which
may influence both decision to get insured and seek care.
Our study is also the first empirical study exploring utili-
sation of inpatient care in Indonesia, which is underre-
ported in most Indonesian health insurance studies.
Methods
Study population and data source
The main data were obtained from the Indonesia Family
Life Survey (IFLS) 2007 and 2014. IFLS is a longitudinal
survey of socio-economic characteristics and population
health; the survey is based on a sample of households
living in 13 of the country’s 27 provinces in 1993. The
selected provinces were chosen to maximise representation
of the population (83% of the Indonesian population) and
be cost-effective to survey given the vast area and difficult
terrain of the country (Strauss et al. 2016). All IFLS data
are publicly available. The JKN programme began in
January 2014 and implemented nationally. IFLS 2014 was
conducted between September 2014–March 2015, which
means that IFLS 2007 data can be treated as the baseline
and 2014 data as the follow-up, thereby allowing panel
data analysis. Response rate in IFLS 2007 was 93.6%
(Strauss et al. 2016). There were 29,014 adults who com-
pleted individual questionnaires in 2007, but only 22,711
individuals completed the same questionnaires in 2014,
yielding an attrition rate of 21.73%. The reasons for non-
completion amongst the 6303 individuals are depicted in
Online Resource 1.
Treatment and control groups
In order to estimate a causal effect from a before and after
study, both the treated and control groups must be unin-
sured in 2007. Furthermore, the treated group must have no
other insurance than the JKN programme, including pre-
vious insurance with Askes, Jamsostek, or private insur-
ance, to prevent the spill-over effect. Out of 22,711
individuals, we excluded 10,650 individuals following
those two criteria. Thus, the following treatment and con-
trol groups were defined for this analysis:
(1) JKN contributory group (N = 982): individuals who
were uninsured in 2007 but then enrolled voluntarily
in 2014. This group may represent self-employed
individuals or people who worked in the informal
sector, but they were not categorised as poor.
(2) JKN subsidised group (N = 2503): individuals who
were uninsured in 2007 but qualified for subsidised
JKN premiums in 2014. This group is qualified for
subsidised premiums based on a proxy means test
defined by the government.
(3) Uninsured group (N = 8576): individuals who were
uninsured in 2007 and remained uninsured in 2014.
In this analysis, each of the contributory and subsidised
group was compared to the uninsured, as a control group,
separately.
Outcome and control variables
The outcome variables were use of outpatient care in the
last 4 weeks and use of inpatient care in the last 12 months.
Longer period for inpatient care was chosen as this type of
care is rarely used compared to outpatient care (Bhandari
D. Erlangga et al.
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and Wagner 2006). For both types of care, two related
outcomes were defined: a binary variable taking the value
of one if the respondent reported seeking care, and a
continuous variable which records the frequency of visits.
The number of visits was also differentiated based on type
of facilities: public or private.
We followed Andersen’s behavioural model in choosing
control variables for our model. We controlled for age,
gender, marital status, urban/rural residence, education
level, and socio-economic status as those are predisposing
characteristics and enabling factors that influence people’s
decision to seek care (Aday and Andersen 1974). Assets
index was chosen as a proxy measure of socio-economic
status when neither income nor expenditure data are
available (Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Sahn and Stifel 2003).
Information on the asset index was based on a number of
input variables, including durable assets and dwelling
characteristics. Principal components analysis (PCA)
was employed in creating the asset index (Vyas and
Kumaranayake 2006). The Cronbach’s alpha for the assets
index is 0.78 which lies within the acceptable range of
0.7–0.8 indicating a good internal consistency (Bland and
Altman 1997). In this analysis, we also included three
health status variables to capture the evaluated need that
may prompt individuals to seek care (Andersen 1995): the
number of acute conditions, the number of chronic condi-
tions, and the presence of disability. Medical conditions
included in the construction of health status variable are
explained in Online Resource 2. Multiple health conditions
are associated with increased utilisation hence the inclusion
of a number of conditions (Palladino et al. 2016). We also
included the availability of healthcare facilities in the
community area as a density variable, separated into pri-
mary care facilities for outpatient care and hospitals for
inpatient care, to control for supply of health care. Binary
variables for each IFLS province are also included to
capture unobserved time-fixed effect that may correlate
with the demand and supply of care in the area (Gravelle
et al. 2003). We also included a binary variable indicating
the recipients of unconditional cash transfer as it may
influence individual’s decision to seek care by increasing
household income temporarily (Sparrow et al. 2013).
An important consideration when estimating the impact
of JKN is the insurance selection bias. A decision to enrol
in health insurance may not be random, i.e. it may be
correlated with the outcome of health insurance (Cutler and
Zeckhauser 1998). Hence, any observed and unobserved
factors influencing the participation decision can poten-
tially introduce bias in our estimation model. To overcome
this, we utilised the panel structure of IFLS data by com-
bining a difference-in-differences (DID) approach with
propensity score matching (PSM). We accounted for
potential bias due to observable factors using PSM which
balances the observed characteristics of the insured and
uninsured groups. An attractive feature of PSM compared
to regression type estimators is its nonparametric nature
because PSM assumes a flexible functional form to esti-
mate the outcome model (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). A
better statistical balance between treatment and control
group after matching based on the estimated propensity
score is more important than finding the appropriate model
for the outcome variables (Wagstaff et al. 2009).
To implement PSM, a logit model was estimated for log
odds of enrolment in JKN programme in 2014 using control
variables in 2007, ensuring the exogeneity of the observ-
ables (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Based on this model,
the propensity score was predicted for each individual for
both contributory and subsidised groups separately. In
addition, we included the sample weight to achieve unbiased
treatment effect estimates generalisable to the original sur-
vey target population (Dugoff et al. 2014).
Kernel matching was chosen as the matching algorithm
with a choice of calliper of bandwidth equal to 0.2 of the
standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score
(Austin 2011). Standard errors were calculated by boot-
strapping to allow for an estimation of the sampling vari-
ance of estimated propensity score parameters (Caliendo
and Kopeinig 2008). We also generated the histograms of
the propensity scores after matching to check overlap and
region of common support, and the scatterplot of the
standardised differences vs residual variance ratios to
check covariate imbalance before and after matching
(Leuven and Sianesi 2003).
Next, we used DID to account for any time-fixed
unobservable factors that may bias our estimates (Heckman
et al. 1998; Wagstaff et al. 2009). An important assumption
in DID analysis is parallel trend assumption which assumes
that the outcome for both insured and uninsured groups
follow a similar trend before the introduction of health
insurance. To test this assumption, we performed a placebo
test by estimating the impact of JKN on the DID estimates
from IFLS 2000 and 2007 (Angrist and Pischke 2008). If
this assumption is valid, then the treatment variable should
not have any statistically significant effect on past out-
comes at 5% level.
While DID is able to eliminate time-fixed unobservable
factors, the unobservable bias due to time-varying unob-
servable factors persists. To assess this bias, we calculated
the Rosenbaum bounds for the treatment effects. This test
gives an indication of the extent of this bias required to
undermine interpretation of the propensity score estimates
(Rosenbaum 2002). The objective is to determine the
smallest value of bias that will change the p value of the
relationship between treatment and outcomes to a non-
significant level (Liu et al. 2013). All analyses were per-
formed using Stata v14.
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Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents a descriptive table of the outcomes and
control variables for each group. Compared to the unin-
sured, both insured groups had higher proportion and
frequency of utilisation of outpatient and inpatient care in
both years, except for higher proportion and total inpatient
visits for the uninsured compared to the subsidised group in
2007. These results indicated the possibility of an insurance
selection effect, as the insured groups were observed to
have a higher probability or level before the reform was
introduced
Table 1 Summary statistics for outcome and control variables by insurance status, Indonesia, 2007 and 2014
Variables 2007 2014
Uninsured
(N = 8564)
Contributory
(N = 975)
Subsidised
(N = 2495)
Uninsured
(N = 8564)
Contributory
(N = 975)
Subsidised
(N = 2495)
Outcome variables
Proportion of having
outpatient visits (%)
12 14.4 13.2 14.5 23.4 17.4
Number of outpatient visits
(all)
0.16 0.25 0.19 0.23 0.44 0.32
Number of outpatient visits
(public)
0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.18 0.16
Number of outpatient visits
(private)
0.12 0.20 0.12 0.16 0.26 0.16
Proportion of having inpatient
visits (%)
2 3.3 1.7 2.6 11.2 4.2
Number of inpatient visits (all) 0.022 0.036 0.018 0.037 0.149 0.058
Number of inpatient visits
(public)
0.012 0.015 0.012 0.021 0.088 0.042
Number of inpatient visits
(private)
0.010 0.021 0.006 0.016 0.061 0.016
Control variables
Age (year) 37 33 38 43 40 44
Male (%) 46 42 45 46 42 45
Single (%) 19 24 15 9 10 6
Married (%) 73 72 77 79 82 81
Divorced/widowed (%) 9 4 8 13 9 12
Urban (%) 41 71 44 41 71 44
Primary education (%) 41 22 50 41 21 49
Secondary education (%) 44 61 38 43 60 38
College (%) 2 6 1 2 5 1
Higher education (%) 3 8 1 6 13 2
No education (%) 9 3 9 8 2 9
Poorest—lowest quintile* (%) 20 9 33 20 7 32
Richest—highest quintile* (%) 16 35 5 17 40 7
No. of acute conditions 2 2.4 2 3 4 4
No. of chronic conditions 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.32 0.38 0.31
Any disability (%) 0.9 1.4 0.3 8 12 7
Density of outpatient health
facilities**
0.2 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.1
Density of inpatient health
facilities**
0.04 0.1 0.02 0.05 0.2 0.03
Recipient of unconditional
cash transfer (%)
16 13 35 1 11.2 53
*Quintiles were determined based on assets index
**Density variables were derived from number of facilities divided by the village/township size in hectare (1 hectare = 10,000 m2)
D. Erlangga et al.
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Looking at the control variables, individuals covered by
the JKN contributory scheme were younger, more likely to
live in an urban area, wealthier, more likely to have
completed higher education, and more likely to live in an
area with more health facilities compared to the uninsured.
Meanwhile, individuals with JKN subsidised were poorer,
less likely to finish higher education, more likely to receive
cash transfers, and living in an area with fewer health
facilities compared to the uninsured. Overall, this com-
parison confirms our suspicion that the JKN contributory
and subsidised groups have different characteristics that
may influence the decision to get insured and seek care.
Impact estimates
Figure 1a and b shows the histograms for the propensity scores
aftermatching. Despite its skewed distribution, there are ample
overlaps between the treated and the control group implying
that thematching has successfully retained adequate samples to
avoid attrition bias from the cases of off-support. Figure 1c and
d shows that aftermatching, the standardised percentage of bias
across covariates has been reduced to near zero.
Table 2 reports results of the PSM-DID analysis of
outpatient care while Table 3 shows findings for inpatient
care. Based on Tables 2 and 3, the contributory group had
7.9 per cent (95% CI 4.3–11.4%) and 8.2 per cent (95% CI
5.9–10.5%) higher probabilities of using outpatient and
inpatient care, respectively, compared to the uninsured. In
addition, the contributory group had 0.16 (95% CI
0.05–0.27) more outpatient visits per person per month and
0.1 (95% CI 0.08–0.14) more inpatient visits per person per
year compared to the uninsured. This higher number of
total visits was likely to occur in public facilities.
Looking at the second panel of both Tables 2 and 3, it
appears that the JKN programme increased the probability of
seeking care at outpatient facilities amongst the subsidised
group by 2 per cent (95%CI- 0.4 to 4.3%). Meanwhile, the
subsidised group also increased their probability of having
any inpatient visit by 1.76 per cent (95% CI 0.7–2.8%)
compared to the uninsured. In addition, the JKN subsidised
group spent more number of visits to both outpatient and
inpatient care compared to the uninsured.
Tables 2 and 3 also demonstrate the impact of JKN pro-
gramme stratified by quintiles of the asset index. The impact on
the contributory groupwas observed across all quintiles, except
the poorest (first quintile). Meanwhile, the effects on the sub-
sidised group showed a different pattern: increased outpatient
utilisation was higher in the second quintile, but the effect on
inpatient utilisation was stronger amongst the third and fourth
quintiles. No effect was observed amongst the poorest quintile.
The impact estimates were also stratified by urban and
rural area. Amongst the contributory group, enrollees from
both rural and urban areas showed a similar pattern of
positive and significant effect on both outpatient and inpa-
tient utilisation. Subsidised individuals living in rural areas
showed a positive impact on inpatient utilisation, whereas
those living in urban areas showed a positive impact only on
the frequency of outpatient utilisation in public facilities.
Table 4 also demonstrates the heterogeneity of the JKN
effect by supply-side factors, measured by the density of
healthcare facilities. The calculation of density variables
was done separately for outpatient and inpatient care. Then,
we sorted the samples from the lowest to the highest based
on the density variables and divided the samples into four
equal group (quartiles). We compared the effect on the
lowest density (first quartile) and the highest quartile
(fourth quartile). Almost no significant effect was observed
in the area with a low density of healthcare facilities. In the
high-density area, however, the effect on inpatient visits
was large and significant for both the contributory and
subsidised groups. This further confirms the suggestion that
the effect of health insurance can only be realised given the
availability of nearby healthcare facilities.
To ensure the validity of our results, we conducted
several robustness checks. Firstly, we checked the potential
influence of the unobserved time-varying confounders by
calculating Rosenbaum bounds (Table 4). The effect on the
probability of utilising inpatient care looks more
stable than the effect on outpatient care. The effect on the
JKN contributory group is only sensitive to a bias that
would triple the effect of insurance on probability of
seeking inpatient care, whereas the subsidised group has a
lower threshold. All frequency variables, however, are
quite sensitive to unobserved time-varying confounders.
Secondly, we ran a placebo regression to test the parallel
trend assumption by using data from IFLS 2000 and 2007
(Table 4). Parallel trend assumption is valid if none of the
outcomes in this placebo test are significant. From Table 4, it
appears that none of the outcome variables shows any signifi-
cant effect, taken as a p value equal to or less than 0.05. The
PSM-DID model therefore passed the parallel trend
assumption.
Thirdly, we also checked the robustness of our impact
estimates by different calliper of kernel matching (see online
resources 3). It is shown in Online Resources 3 that overall
our impact estimates for both groups are not sensitive to the
size of the bandwidth for calculating the distance in kernel
matching. The magnitude and the significance of the esti-
mates seemed stable even at bandwidth 0.001.
Discussion
This study has analysed the impact of JKN programme on
access to care measured by individual’s healthcare utili-
sation. This study’s findings suggest that the JKN
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programme has increased the probability of individuals
seeking outpatient and inpatient care. This impact is
stronger amongst the contributory group, which likely
comes from the wealthier and more educated population.
This finding is consistent with evidence from other coun-
tries (Nguyen 2012; Robyn et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2013;
Bernal et al. 2017). The impact on frequency of visits,
however, is more sensitive to unobserved time-varying
variables indicating that our estimated treatment effects
may overestimate the true treatment effect on frequency of
visits. We also found a marginal increase in utilisation
amongst the subsidised group but this impact is more
Fig. 1 Common support and bias balance after kernel matching for
both insured and uninsured population, Indonesia, 2007–2014. All
figures were produced by Stata v14. a Shows support between treated
and untreated for the contributory group, whereas b is for the
subsidised group. Each bar represents the density of observations
from the insured and uninsured. Common support assumption is
satisfied when there are enough untreated observations paired with the
treated within the same propensity score range. c and d Show the
reduced bias before and after matching for the contributory and
subsidised group, respectively. It is desirable to have both standard-
ised percent bias and variance ratio of residuals as low as possible
(near zero)
D. Erlangga et al.
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Table 2 Impact of the Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) programme on outpatient utilisation for both contributory and subsidised groups,
stratified by asset index quintiles, urban/rural area, and density of healthcare facilities, Indonesia, 2007 and 2014
Probability of having
outpatient visits
Number of outpatient
visits (all)
Number of outpatient visits
(public)
Number of outpatient visits
(private)
Panel A: contributory
group
Overall 0.079*** 0.158*** 0.115*** 0.043
(0.018) (0.057) (0.022) (0.047)
Quintile 1
(poorest)
- 0.024 - 0.018 0.052 - 0.070
(0.063) (0.112) (0.056) (0.091)
Quintile 2 0.113** 0.312 0.173* 0.139
(0.056) (0.194) (0.099) (0.142)
Quintile 3 0.106*** 0.172 0.176*** - 0.005
(0.031) (0.279) (0.065) (0.279)
Quintile 4 0.088** 0.081 0.060* 0.021
(0.039) (0.073) (0.033) (0.066)
Quintile 5
(richest)
0.083** 0.207** 0.126*** 0.081
(0.038) (0.081) (0.037) (0.066)
Urban 0.085*** 0.146** 0.119*** 0.026
(0.021) (0.066) (0.025) (0.060)
Rural 0.068** 0.199* 0.109*** 0.090
(0.032) (0.111) (0.031) (0.093)
Low densitya 0.016 0.097 0.046 0.051
(0.038) (0.153) (0.040) (0.165)
High densitya 0.035 0.067 0.148** - 0.081)
(0.031) (0.103) (0.060) (0.099)
Panel B: subsidised
group
Overall 0.019 0.063*** 0.059*** 0.004
(0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.016)
Quintile 1
(poorest)
- 0.011 0.013 0.009 0.004
(0.021) (0.046) (0.039) (0.023)
Quintile 2 0.069*** 0.126** 0.112*** 0.015
(0.027) (0.060) (0.037) (0.034)
Quintile 3 0.006 0.056 0.087* - 0.031
(0.020) (0.047) (0.045) (0.033)
Quintile 4 0.013 0.047 0.066* - 0.020
(0.024) (0.044) (0.034) (0.033)
Quintile 5
(richest)
0.093* 0.180* 0.044 0.136*
(0.054) (0.101) (0.060) (0.081)
Urban 0.032 0.112*** 0.114*** - 0.002
(0.021) (0.038) (0.028) (0.027)
Rural 0.011 0.025 0.019 0.006
(0.013) (0.037) (0.024) (0.029)
Low densitya 0.016 0.068 0.017 0.051
(0.020) (0.037) (0.031) (0.028)
High densitya 0.048 0.155** 0.134*** 0.021
(0.032) (0.060) (0.032) (0.049)
aThe samples were first sorted from the lowest to the highest based on the density variables and then divided into four equal group (quartiles).
The first and fourth quartiles become the low density and high density, respectively
The reported standard errors in parentheses were calculated by bootstrapping with 200 replications. Quintiles were determined based on assets
index in 2007. Significance: *p\ 0.1; **p\ 0.05; ***p\ 0.01
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Table 3 Impact of the Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) programme on inpatient utilisation for both the contributory and subsidised groups, by
asset index quintiles, urban/rural area, and density of healthcare facilities, Indonesia, 2007 and 2014
Probability of having
inpatient visits
Number of inpatient
visits (all)
Number of inpatient visits
(public)
Number of inpatient visits
(private)
Panel A: contributory
group
Overall 0.082*** 0.109*** 0.073*** 0.036***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013)
Quintile 1
(poorest)
0.041 0.046 0.006 0.040
(0.047) (0.056) (0.035) (0.029)
Quintile 2 0.081** 0.184*** 0.117** 0.067
(0.029) (0.061) (0.048) (0.048)
Quintile 3 0.099*** 0.113** 0.083** 0.030
(0.034) (0.050) (0.038) (0.025)
Quintile 4 0.095*** 0.126*** 0.090** 0.036**
(0.029) (0.041) (0.036) (0.015)
Quintile 5
(richest)
0.071*** 0.080*** 0.054*** 0.026
(0.019) (0.025) (0.012) (0.023)
Urban 0.097*** 0.128*** 0.082*** 0.046***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015)
Rural 0.044** 0.063** 0.051*** 0.013
(0.018) (0.031) (0.015) (0.020)
Low densitya 0.025 0.050 0.038 0.013
(0.022) (0.050) (0.038) (0.013)
High densitya 0.103*** 0.176*** 0.105*** 0.076***
(0.022) (0.039) (0.025) (0.076)
Panel B: subsidised
group
Overall 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.005
(0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)
Quintile 1
(poorest)
0.015 0.010 0.012 - 0.002
(0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006)
Quintile 2 - 0.004 - 0.001 0.010 - 0.011
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006)
Quintile 3 0.032*** 0.042** 0.033* 0.009
(0.011) (0.021) (0.019) (0.008)
Quintile 4 0.030** 0.049* 0.039 0.010
(0.014) (0.028) (0.027) (0.007)
Quintile 5
(richest)
0.017 0.043 0.009 0.034
(0.023) (0.049) (0.029) (0.047)
Urban 0.016* 0.026* 0.019 0.007
(0.009) (0.016) (0.015) (0.008)
Rural 0.017** 0.019* 0.018** 0.001
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005)
Low densitya 0.016 0.012 - 0.001 0.008
(0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010)
High densitya 0.030*** 0.047*** 0.029*** 0.021
(0.013) (0.018) (0.010) (0.017)
aThe samples were first sorted from the lowest to the highest based on the density variables and then divided into four equal group (quartiles).
The first and fourth quartiles become the low density and high density, respectively
The reported standard errors in parentheses were calculated by bootstrapping with 200 replications. Quintiles were determined based on assets
index in 2007. Significance: *p\ 0.1; **p\ 0.05; ***p\ 0.01
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sensitive to unobserved time-varying factors. It is also
likely that any effect amongst the subsidised group was
picking up lagged effects from the introduction of Jam-
kesmas in 2008 that was targeted to poor population.
Overall, we found limited evidence to support the benefit
of the JKN programme for the subsidised group.
Our study also showed that the majority of uninsured
individuals in 2007 remained uninsured in 2014 implying
slow JKN enrolment process. The contributory group rep-
resents self-selected participation in the JKN programme,
while the subsidised group has limited power to determine
their eligibility. Therefore, the success of the JKN pro-
gramme hinges on factors that influence people’s decision
to join the JKN contributory scheme. People are more
likely to enrol in health insurance if they are more likely to
use them, referred to as adverse selection in economic
literature (Cutler and Zeckhauser 1998). Individuals
themselves have the best knowledge of whether the benefit
of insurance exceeds the cost, which determines whether or
not people decide to get insured (Kahneman et al. 1991;
Schneider 2004). The contributory group may also be more
proactive in seeking information and treatment and be
more aware of the benefits from the JKN programme
(considered a very comprehensive system) due to having a
higher level of education. Recent evidence from Indonesia
revealed that insurance premiums are not the major
deterrent factor in JKN enrolment, but that patients are
more likely to be influenced by the availability of health
services and a lack of insurance literacy (Dartanto et al.
2016).
It appears that most health insurance studies in
Indonesia seem to avoid analysing the impact on inpatient
care due to the fear of low statistical power associated with
inpatient care. In this study, this low power concern does
not deter finding a significant effect as 1064 out of 22,708
individuals reported any inpatient visit in any formal
healthcare facilities. Rather, we showed that the impact of
the JKN programme was relatively larger on inpatient care
compared to outpatient care. Since inpatient care is gen-
erally more expensive, and the JKN programme offers
comprehensive benefits including hospitalisation in both
public and contracted private hospitals, individuals are
more likely to enrol, particularly if they consider them-
selves as a high-risk individual.
Despite our effort to control for the selection bias by
combining PSM and DID, this study still has several lim-
itations. First, some supply factors have not been controlled
adequately, such as the distance to the nearest facilities or
the qualities of health workers. Nevertheless, this study has
attempted to control for supply factors by including the
density of health facilities available in the village/township
in which the respondents were currently living. Second,
IFLS is not representative of all Indonesian provinces, and
thus, it cannot produce a national estimate. IFLS excluded
most eastern Indonesian provinces, which are considered
underdeveloped compared to their western counterparts.
Another data set that encompasses all Indonesian provinces
is available [e.g. Indonesian Socioeconomic Survey
(SUSENAS)], but it does not provide adequate health
insurance status information or on health utilisation prior to
Table 4 Rosenbaum bounds analyses for the effect of the Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) programme on both contributory and subsidised
groups (the comparator for each group is the uninsured), Indonesia, 2000–2014
Rosenbaum bounds* Placebo test**
Contributory Subsidised Contributory Subsidised
Treatment effect p value Treatment effect p value
Outpatient
Probability of any outpatient care 1.5 1.1 - 0.62% 0.62 0.76% 0.59
Number of outpatient visits (total) 1.1 1.1 - 0.007 0.73 0.018 0.45
Number of outpatient visits (public) 1.1 1.1 0.010 0.50 0.021 0.17
Number of outpatient visits (private) 1.1 1.2 - 0.017 0.28 - 0.003 0.87
Inpatient
Probability of any inpatient care 3 1.5 - 0.64% 0.17 - 0.95% 0.08
Number of inpatient visits (total) 1.5 1.1 - 0.007 0.20 - 0.010 0.11
Number of inpatient visits (public) 1.7 1.1 - 0.002 0.44 - 0.003 0.40
Number of inpatient visits (private) 1.7 1.1 - 0.003 0.41 - 0.007 0.06
*Rosenbaum bounds column shows the coefficient representing the minimum effect of the unobserved time-varying factors would need to have
to bias our treatment effect
**Parallel trend assumption can be upheld if the treatment effect of the placebo test shows no significant effect with assumed type-1 error taken
at 5% level
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2014. Also, IFLS is the only Indonesian panel data set
available to evaluate the JKN, hence its inclusion in this
study. Considering IFLS provinces are more developed
than the non-IFLS provinces, our findings may show the
upper limit of the true impact. It is likely that JKN has
much rather limited impact in the non-IFLS provinces due
to lack of health facilities in underdeveloped provinces, but
the extent of it is another empirical question.
While it is encouraging to observe the positive
impact on both subsidised and contributory groups, the
greater effect on the contributory group indicates a
potential adverse selection effect amongst the more
affluent population. Given the fact that the subsidised
group accounts for the largest proportion of the insured
population, their subsidies paid by the government also
takes up more of the JKN budget. This implies a
potential inequity in how government subsidies are
being targeted in the sense that the poor did not receive
the benefit from the subsidy.
This inequity issue is exacerbated by the fact that the
JKN effect is much stronger in the area with higher
density of healthcare facilities. Since the subsidised group
is more likely to live in rural area with limited healthcare
facilities, we can expect to observe limited effect of
insurance in removing barrier to access of care. Insurance
may ease the financial barriers associated with the fees for
medical treatment (i.e. affordability) but may not be
adequate to remove other barriers to access, such as the
cost of transportation (accessibility) or the availability of
primary clinics and hospitals (Penchansky and Thomas
1981). Improving access to care amongst individuals in
the rural and remote area is still a big homework for the
Indonesian government; the problem that cannot be
solved only by the introduction of public health insurance
for all.
Following this potential inequity, it might be appealing
to compartment the funding between the subsidised and
contributory group to protect the benefit for the poor peo-
ple. However, it is unlikely to solve the inequity issue, as it
is likely to further weakening the viability of JKN pro-
gramme as a single payer. When the risk pooling is unable
to sustain the increased demand from the contributory
group, the restriction of JKN medical benefit and rising
premium is inevitable. The healthier enrollees will dis-
continue their membership leaving the JKN programme
with sicker enrollees who will keep contribute to rising
costs. This cycle will continue which may lead to the
collapse of JKN programme leaving the non-poor people
working in informal sectors uninsured. Rather, we suggest
that policymakers should explore other policy tools to
expand the risk pooling and consider strategic purchasing
to contain the healthcare costs.
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